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Democracy & Religion:  
Some Variations & Hard Questions
Kent Greenawalt 
The ideas sketched here concern the nonestablishment and free exercise norms ex-
pressed in the U.S. Constitution, their application to governmental institutions from 
legislatures to prisons and the military, the place of religion in the curricula of public 
schools, and the proper role of religious convictions in lawmaking. A major concern 
of the essay is the problem of achieving an appropriate balance between govern-
mental neutrality toward religion, as required by the nonestablishment norm, and 
governmental accommodation of religious practices that would otherwise violate 
ordinary laws, as required by the free exercise norm. A recurring theme is the com-
plexity of the issues and the variability of possible solutions given differences in the 
history and culture of democratic societies. 
When one asks about the relation between democracy and religion, we have some answers that seem fairly obvious and others that do not. My basic claims are that there are important variations within democracies, 
that these may affect aspects of the proper treatment of religion, and that even with-
in a modern, liberal democracy like that of the United States, we have some hard 
questions that lack simple answers. Certain answers to these questions do seem true 
across the board; others do not. The latter require a more particular focus.1
What does democracy in general entail? Perhaps we have no precise defini-
tion, but we can take democracy as a system of government in which all adult citi-
zens have a right to vote. Assuming we are not talking about a minuscule political 
order in which ordinary people would directly determine prevailing law, citizens 
elect legislators, and the highest executive officials are either also subject to citi-
zen votes or are chosen by legislatures. I think we can say that if it is a genuine de-
mocracy–that is, a country that recognizes the political rights of all citizens–it 
will allow people to choose whether or not to worship and essentially what form 
of worship to engage in. Of course, there can be some limitations if a form of wor-
ship is obviously harmful for those engaging in it or for others. 
What people see now as counting as a genuine democracy has developed over 
time. The original United States may have been conceived as a democracy, although 
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contemporary conceptions, a political order with either of these factors might not 
be seen to be a genuine democracy. In respect to freedom of worship, one can imag-
ine an exception if a particular religion and most of its followers are committed to 
violent acts against other citizens or overthrowing the basic political system.
T he United States, like many other modern democratic states, has no estab-lished church. What does this nonestablishment norm imply regarding governmental favoring or endorsing some particular religion? Suppose 
members of a particular religion basically form a society. This was true for certain 
sections of the British Colony in America that were created by religious groups, 
some of which maintained influence in the early states. And to note something 
often forgotten, the original First Amendment instructed “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion.” This meant partly that Congress 
could not interfere with state establishments. If we consider those states to have 
been genuinely democratic, we would not see nonestablishment as required for 
democracies in general. To put this a bit differently, if the vast majority of peo-
ple are members of a particular faith, government support for that faith does not 
seem at odds with basic principles of democracy, at least as long as nonadherents 
are both free to worship in a different way, or not to worship, and do not have their 
fundamental political rights, such as voting and running for office, denied because 
they do not adhere to the dominant religion. The fact that a particular religion is 
established might have little effect on the fundamental rights concerning a liberal 
democracy, although it can be in some tension with a maximum sense of religious 
freedom, having a tendency to yield some preferential treatment for those who 
are members of the established church. England, for example, for many years had 
both an established religion in the Church of England and been essentially a de-
mocracy, although it maintained its monarchy.
T he free exercise principle is an important aspect of the general liberties afforded to citizens in modern liberal democracies. Exactly how special it is turns out to be a complex topic on which I will offer a few brief obser-
vations. One can ask about both how human perceptions figure and what our law 
now provides. For seriously religious persons, religious convictions and priorities 
can be central in their lives; they may care deeply about whether the government 
is interfering with these in any way.2 In a diverse society, even people who do not 
themselves possess such feelings do well to recognize them in others. It follows 
that the government should be taking these convictions and sentiments into ac-
count, at least if a significant percentage of the population possesses them. 
When one asks about existing law, matters are factually complex. In the case 
of Employment Division v. Smith in 1990, the Supreme Court decided that for most 
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stitutional free exercise right to special treatment.3 This has led to questions of 
whether the free exercise clause has become redundant, swallowed up by freedom 
of speech and association.4 But a great deal remains in the special status of reli-
gious exercise. Here are five aspects. Employment Division v. Smith does not cover all 
religious practices. Churches and other religious practitioners retain the right to 
limit their clergy to men and to those who are not homosexual.5 Employment Di-
vision also indicates explicitly that legislators can make concessions to religious 
practices.6 We now have the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Re-
ligious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and many similar state provi-
sions that do just that.7 A subtler point concerns circumstances in which the gov-
ernment must treat nonreligious claims the same way it treats similar religious 
ones. Even here, if the religious claims help to provoke the basis for what equal 
treatment is required, free exercise remains important. 
Two further aspects of significance concern the relation between free exercise 
and nonestablishment. The most obvious is that both clauses are designed to pro-
mote government noninterference and freedom of religious belief and practice. 
Free exercise bears on how one should see the basic notion of nonestablishment. 
And sometimes the values of the two clauses do seem to come into conflict, as 
with prayers to begin legislative sessions. If this content is suitably neutral regard-
ing the issues on which the legislative body must vote, those wanting the prayers 
may claim that allowing them is a free exercise right. Then the question is how far 
free exercise qualifies the coverage of nonestablishment, or is itself qualified by 
the conflict.8 In all five of these ways, free exercise remains a special liberty that 
has not become redundant.
When one considers how religions should be treated, one recognizes that giv-
en the diversity of populations, nonestablishment, at least in some form, is need-
ed. In an important sense, the two basic concepts of nonestablishment and free 
exercise work together. If the government favors one religion over others, that 
will enhance the actual practices of that religion, while possibly interfering with 
what other religions do. Also important, favoritism is bound to encourage some 
people to get involved with that religion; this impairs the basic idea that people 
should choose freely whether to join a particular form of religion, without being 
pushed by the government. Some obvious examples are these. If the government 
promotes strong financial support for and endorses a particular religion, involve-
ment in that religion may seem more attractive to someone not already dedicated 
to another faith. And if favoring includes teaching of a particular religion within 
public schools, that could incline students to believe that it is the true religion. 
Of course, teaching about a religion is not the same as teaching or implying its 
truth, but that distinction may not be simple for teachers or students. Neverthe-
less, omitting reference to religion in human history would convey a nonobjec-
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For the values underlying both free exercise and nonestablishment, the gov-
ernment should not favor some religion over others. This key to the basic idea of 
nonestablishment is strongly supported by the core value of free exercise, since 
people will feel more free about religion if they understand that the government 
will not favor or disfavor them based on their convictions or the groups to which 
they are joined. 
A modest exception to the no-disfavoring occurs if a religious group, or a seg-
ment of that group, supports violence against others. An existing controversial ex-
ample of this concerns Islam. So long as a significantly large proportion of Mus-
lims support violence against non-Muslims or Muslims of different denomina-
tions, it may be appropriate to do a more careful screening of Muslims–at least 
Muslim adult males who are not elderly–who seek entry into the United States. 
This cautionary policy differs from objectionable “racial profiling” in deciding 
who to admit to our country. 
Although free exercise and nonestablishment basically fit with one another, 
we do have, as mentioned, certain tensions between them. For some of these, it 
is not easy to say what are the right approaches within a liberal democracy. Per-
haps the most obvious example is government engagement in religious practices 
and messages, at least if these do not promote some particular religious beliefs 
and groups over others. Is it appropriate for legislative sessions to begin with non-
denominational prayers and for presidents to end formal addresses with an appre-
ciation of God and a request for God’s help? Presidents, like ordinary citizens, are 
free to have their own religious convictions, but when they reference those con-
victions in an official speech, such as a yearly address to Congress, their comments 
amount to something beyond a simple personal expression. If most officials, as 
well as most citizens, have religious beliefs, free exercise can support their expres-
sions for such occasions. For the most part, what the nonestablishment clause re-
quires does not depend on the religious outlook of citizens and officials, but the 
extent to which free exercise concerns may qualify likely applications could de-
pend on it. Of course, what is generally relevant is the content and context of the 
religious element in a public speech.
One way to view some of the apparent religious references is to see them as 
merely “ceremonial deism,” referring to the culture and history of the country. 
This was suggested by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor regarding the use of “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.10 Although this perception may be accurate as a 
representation of how a great many citizens regard the pledge, I am skeptical that 
these are the dominant understandings of either aliens who say the pledge before 
becoming citizens or students in public schools who are called upon to do so. I 
think many in these categories, as well as some others, will perceive the pledge as 
including an acknowledgment about the place of God, or at least references to an 
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The military and prisons, coercive institutions in which citizens lose many of their rights, are two special government domains. For both of these, the government should in some form provide religious exercise for those whose 
overall freedom is constrained. For military members stationed abroad in combat 
zones or aboard navy ships, the government may need to provide clerics themselves. 
For prisoners, it may manage by bringing clerics from outside to enter and provide 
services. The free exercise clause should here be taken to require, or at least autho-
rize, reasonable efforts by the government to provide actual opportunities for typi-
cal exercise for those not free to go where they can worship as they choose. 
An interesting question connected to all this is whether nonreligious activi-
ties and convictions should be treated equally. A believer in absolute “neutrality” 
might think the right answer is “yes”; but I believe, as noted earlier, that this view 
is an oversimplification. If soldiers and prisoners are given time to pray or an op-
portunity to have their dietary needs satisfied, allowing others a time to reflect 
or satisfy their genuine convictions about acceptable food makes sense, but the 
provision of clerics is different. Despite some decline, religion remains very im-
portant in the lives of many Americans, and for most religions, the role of clerics 
is central to worship. One might imagine some nonreligious analogue, in which a 
leader is central to gatherings organized around basic values and experience, but 
actual examples are few or nonexistent. For something like actual military chap-
lains, we cannot expect a government accession to a nonreligious analogue. Here 
religion will appropriately be given special status. However, apart from special 
cases, government need not provide for clerics in all denominations in every mil-
itary situation in which there is a need for a chaplain. In some cases, nondenomi-
national chaplains might have the appropriate skills.
Prisons present harder questions still, such as whether religion should count 
about judgments concerning parole and, if so, what the role of clerics should be. Al-
though this consideration could produce concern about dishonest affiliations, if it 
is true that religious involvement makes subsequent criminal acts less likely, parole 
boards should be able to take that involvement into account. They should, howev-
er, probably avoid making these determinations vary depending on precise statis-
tics about particular denominations. An obvious exception to equal treatment con-
cerns attachment to religions that themselves promote criminal acts. An interest-
ing special example here concerns a religion that encourages polygamy. One might 
conclude that its members are more likely to commit what counts as a particular 
violation of law, but no more likely or even less likely to commit other crimes. 
Determining the proper role of clerics in parole board decisions is itself not 
simple. If religious practices and convictions are to be taken into account, cler-
ics need to be able to testify about individual applicants for parole, although this 
constitutes religious personnel seriously affecting a certain kind of official deter-
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mation bearing on the problem of recidivism and their describing the specifically 
religious character of the prisoner, which might or might not have such a bearing.
In a number of states, clerics actually serve on parole boards. That may well be 
too great an involvement of clergy in government decisions, an involvement espe-
cially likely to encourage prisoners to get involved with the particular religions of 
those clerics. I believe this practice should be regarded as at odds with the values 
of nonestablishment and free exercise.
Public schools in democratic societies generate their own problems. As a matter of principle, schools should teach about the place of religion in hu-man history, but not the truth or falsity of a particular faith. They should 
also not teach more general points, such as that a loving God genuinely exists, 
or that atheism is actually true. The distinction between teaching about religion 
and teaching a religious claim as true may be difficult for teachers to draw and for 
schoolchildren to perceive. This may lead some to conclude that it is desirable for 
those subjects simply to be omitted. But doing that would yield an incomplete ac-
count of what has mattered historically and would do so in a way that minimizes 
the actual place of religion. One could see this as a form of establishment of non-
religion conceived as presupposing atheism or at least as minimizing the actual 
place of religious views and practices in human life. This would implicitly encour-
age a kind of minimization of the importance of religion in students’ perspectives. 
Despite the complexities about distinguishing between an “objective” account of 
various beliefs and practices and an apparent implication of their likely truth and 
intrinsic value, to totally disregard the place of religion in human life and in our 
culture is much worse. Public schools properly include religious topics in what 
they cover, while teachers should at the same time try hard not to endorse any par-
ticular religious conviction.
When it comes to teaching subjects like evolution that are well established by 
science but conflict with the religious beliefs of those that take certain biblical 
passages about creation as literally true, should teachers delve into the compet-
ing version? I believe not, although teachers may tell students that some people 
have a strikingly conflicting religious view. If a topic is subject to rational anal-
ysis and does not depend on any particular religious outlook, it is appropriately 
taught for itself in public schools. This would be true of mathematics and science 
among others. Concerns that are raised by a subject, such as worries about cli-
mate change, are appropriately covered. When it comes to competing views that 
are based on entirely different premises about reality, such as a biblical account of 
when God created human beings, it is fine for a teacher to mention these, but not 
appropriate to explore them in analytical detail.11
Matters are more complicated when it comes to moral issues. Some moral 
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vide care for their children, and no one should kill another due to slight irritation. 
But we do not have simple rational answers about when abortions are not a mat-
ter of moral concern and what laws and public policies should thereby be institut-
ed. Similar concerns exist for whether adoption by intergender couples should be 
preferred over gay couples because it is desirable for a child to have parents of both 
genders. I am assuming here that gay couples should have the right to marry they 
were accorded by the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, and that this includes 
a right to adopt children.12 But it does not necessarily follow that parental genders 
are irrelevant to who might be favored for a specific adoption. When it comes to 
such issues, it may be best for teachers briefly to explain opposing views, includ-
ing religious ones, but without getting into details. Something similar may be ap-
propriate for some political issues, although Donald Trump’s presidency has led 
many to believe those involve certain moral concerns that have correct answers, 
such as whether political leaders should be basically honest.
What of religious convictions in lawmaking? Should laws and policies in our liberal democracy, or any democracy, be based exclusively on grounds that are not religious or anti-religious? If so, both legislators 
and citizens with relevant religious convictions about an issue should make ev-
ery effort to disregard them in their political stances. How persuasive or realistic 
this position is turns out to be quite complicated. We need to distinguish among 
kinds of issues, between legislators versus ordinary citizens, and between actual 
reliance versus articulated bases for a stance, as well as how much courts should 
be involved in all this in constitutional and statutory interpretation. One may 
think it is healthy for judges constitutionally to protect the exercise of religion 
from ordinary laws that impair it. But with a few exceptions, the Supreme Court 
decided, in Employment Division v. Smith, that no such right exists. That leaves it in 
principle up to legislators to decide about the range of special treatment for reli-
gion. Ironically, legislators may decide to adopt a flexible standard that reinstates 
the range of judgments left to judges. This is what Congress did with the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act.13
Political decisions that actually favor one religion over others are not of gen-
eral concern: under a basic nonestablishment principle, such laws and executive 
practices should not be adopted and citizens should not support them. More de-
serving of our concentration are essentially nonreligious questions, about which 
religious teachings may take particular positions. An obvious example that has 
existed throughout time is how much aid the government should give to people 
who are poor and disadvantaged. A different illustration concerns a modern con-
troversy in the United States: is it or is it not acceptable to separate children from 
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How simple is it for someone to distinguish the weight of nonreligious con-
victions from religious ones and to assess their degree of personal influence over 
time? Suppose that someone believes she should make a decision on non religious 
grounds: the government should give substantial aid to the poor and disadvan-
taged because it is the just thing to do. Yet she also believes that a loving God 
strongly wishes people to provide that kind of help to others. For most such peo-
ple, it would be very hard or nearly impossible to discount completely their reli-
gious beliefs in arriving at an attempted religious-independent position. 
Let us consider a more complicated example. Suppose someone was raised in 
a religion that takes a strong position on a particular issue, such as aid to the poor, 
abortion, or same-sex marriage. In his early years, he was a devoted follower and 
embraced these positions. As he grew older, his religious convictions disappeared, 
and he came to regard religious bases as irrelevant. But when our subject thinks 
about contentious issues in nonreligious terms, can he really discount the influ-
ence of his earlier views? In a straightforward way, his past perspective could lead 
him to believe that what he long accepted as sound positions on crucial social is-
sues remain so. But we can also imagine a kind of reverse influence. If a person 
now believes the religion itself is foolish, he might conceivably discount the force 
of nonreligious reasons that support political positions the religious group has 
taken. 
When we put all this together we can see how hard it could be for many peo-
ple to genuinely rely only on nonreligious thinking.14 This counts strongly against 
telling citizens that they should rely only on nonreligious reasons. More directly, 
assuming many in the country do have religious convictions, when it comes to is-
sues that do not directly concern religion, such as public aid for the poor, I do not 
think it should be seen as wrong, nor as a kind of establishment, for them to rely 
self-consciously on the religious truth in which they believe. 
Given that legislators represent many kinds of citizens, the more powerful ar-
gument is that they should rely as far as possible on nonreligious reasons, reasons 
of a kind that can be shared by rational citizens independent of any religious con-
victions they may have.15 Legislators, however, like the rest of us, may have some 
difficulty figuring out how far religion has influenced their positions. Of course, 
one nonreligious factor for legislators is a need to satisfy the desires and convic-
tions of those they represent. And that could well include giving a degree of weight 
to the religiously based positions of members of that group. 
When we turn to public articulations defending positions, as in open legisla-
tive sessions, political platforms, and campaign speeches, we can expect legisla-
tors to rely on nonreligious bases that are widely accepted. And in a liberal democ-
racy, it makes good sense for advocating citizens to act similarly. If this is right, 
then the public arguments for positions may be more nonreligious than the com-
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Does religion merit special treatment in a liberal democracy? To approach this complicated and sometimes highly controversial question, I begin with three important generalizations. The first is that the appropriate an-
swers may well not be the same for all types of liberal democracy. The beliefs and 
practices of most citizens will shift over time and will be quite different in dif-
ferent countries. The best answers for a given country depend partly on the cul-
tures of the country at the time. Here I focus on the present-day United States. The 
second generalization is that even in the context of a single democratic country, 
we should not assume that there is one decisive answer to apply across the board. 
It may well be that religious convictions and practices will warrant special treat-
ments in some parts of a country but not others. The third point is that, for this 
discourse, one should not rely directly on an individual religious conviction itself 
but rather reasons that have wide acceptance.
Among the issues of concern here are non-favoritism of some groups or indi-
viduals over others, concessions to beliefs and practices, and specific privileges 
for groups.
A core idea of nonestablishment that contributes to free exercise is that the 
government should not favor some particular religious bodies and organizations 
over others. Is this special for religion or does it have broader application? There 
is no simple answer. We can certainly understand that the Equal Protection Clause 
precludes favoring white groups or African-American groups, and the Free Speech 
Clause may similarly bar certain categorizations, but at least in our present culture, 
the constraint concerning treatment of religious groups is taken as more absolute. 
To this degree, the free exercise and nonestablishment clauses do exercise a greater 
constraint against differential treatment than do other constitutional provisions.
If the government does not favor a particular religious group over others, may 
it grant some privilege to religious groups that does not exist for nonreligious 
groups? Of course, concessions should not allow religious groups to directly harm 
others or to receive privileges that have nothing to do with their religious practic-
es. But that leaves us with questions about religious practices that may be at odds 
with general legal requirements. Two notable examples here are hiring decisions 
and the consumption of substances.
Suppose a religion holds that God has instructed us that only men should be 
priests. Precluding women from the position is at odds with established law pro-
hibiting gender discrimination. But to tell members of a religion that they must 
accept as clergy those they believe are ineligible would be a substantial restraint on 
their free exercise. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has accepted the practice 
by churches, including the Roman Catholic Church, of limiting clerics to men.16 
When it comes to controlled substances, what is generally forbidden by law 
may be part of a core practice of a religion. Two examples here involve commu-
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bans the sale and drinking of alcohol, the wine example is no longer a practical 
concern; but such bans did exist in the United States in the past. Some Christians 
believe God has instructed the ritual consumption of wine as a representation 
of the blood of Jesus, and many others think this use is at least symbolically val-
id. Given the small amount of wine taken by those participating in communion, 
which itself does not elicit typical concerns about the consumption of alcohol, an 
exception here was obviously favorable (even if a few consumers might have been 
encouraged by the experience to go home and drink more).
More difficult is the case of religious use of peyote, since the basic effects result-
ing from religious medicinal use are not so different from those generally regarded 
as harmful or dangerous enough to warrant a broad prohibition. Whether the use 
in a religious service is enough to warrant an exemption is a more nuanced ques-
tion, with complicating factors of sovereignty and history, among many others.
Should individuals be excused from ordinary legal requirements, such as military conscription, because of religious convictions and, if so, when? Should nonreligious convictions get the same treatment? Obviously, if the 
legal requirement offers citizens protection from substantial harm, such as crim-
inal laws prohibiting battery, no special exemption should go to religious individ-
uals and groups. It may, however, be acceptable for religious groups to discipline 
and treat their own members in more subtly negative ways that could be subject 
to tort liability in other contexts. 
What if the privilege does not cause direct harm to anyone? Shall a religious 
objector be excused from jury duty or a military draft? The draft situation has in-
voked a specific statutory exception, prompting the key question of whether non-
religious claims should be treated similarly. Very briefly, given that a genuine pac-
ifist will not engage in military efforts, a broader exemption clearly makes sense, 
especially if some form of alternate service is required. Congress sought to limit 
the exemption to religious claimants, but the Supreme Court responded by read-
ing “religion” in the statute so broadly that it included those whose pacifist con-
victions were not religious in an ordinary sense.17 (Justice Harlan voted with the 
plurality to make a majority, but his basis was that restricting the privilege to reli-
gious convictions in this context was unconstitutional.)
Readers may disagree with some or many of my actual positions on these complex and controversial issues. But my overarching point is that the right relations of democracy and religion can depend on cultural set-
tings; and even within a particular setting, like the present liberal democracy of 
the United States, we have a number of less-than-simple questions about what is 
called for. These lack complete and indisputable answers. Like much of our lives, 
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author’s note
This essay was written for a research seminar held in Rome in March 2019 and 
sponsored by the Australian Catholic University. For helpful questions and com-
ments, I thank David McCabe, who was my respondent in the seminar. I benefited 
greatly from suggestions from Robert Audi.
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